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Human supremacy as posthuman risk 
 
Daniel Estrada 
New Jersey Institute of Technology 
 
 
Human supremacy is the widely held view that human interests ought to be 
privileged over other interests as a matter of ethics and public policy. 
Posthumanism is the historical situation characterized by a critical reevaluation of 
anthropocentrist theory and practice. This paper draws on animal studies, Rosi 
Braidotti’s critical posthumanism, and the critique of ideal theory in Charles Mills 
and Serene Khader to address the appeal to human supremacist rhetoric in AI 
ethics and policy discussions, particularly in the work of Joanna Bryson. This 
analysis identifies a specific risk posed by human supremacist policy in a 
posthuman context, namely the classification of agents by type. 
 





Against the backdrop of numerous political scandals, ethical violations, 
and calls for regulatory oversight in the field of artificial intelligence 
(Whittaker et al., 2018), the rhetorical framework of the “human” has 
become an increasingly visible shorthand for industry and public policy 
projects to signal a concern for safety, ethical integrity, and the 
responsible use of the AI. Several recent public policy proposals on AI 
bear titles such as “AI for Humanity” in France;1 “HumaneAI”  in the EU;2 
“AI4People”, Luciano Floridi’s proposal describing “An ethical framework 
for a good AI society” (Floridi et al., 2018), and Stanford’s “Institute for 
Human-Centered AI,” whose welcome page proudly proposes that “AI is to 
serve the collective needs of humanity.”3   
 
In these contexts, centering the “human” as the explicit focus of normative 
concern projects the appearance of an inclusive framework of shared 
values and common interests that guide the collective use of AI. More 
subtly, these proposals consistently frame AI as categorically subservient 
to human interests. Unsurprisingly, these proposals don’t define the scope 
or content of the “human,” how membership in this category is to be 
determined, or what underpins its role as a focal norm in AI policy. Still, AI 
is regularly used to target, manipulate, incarcerate, and exploit vulnerable 
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policing and military operations, election tampering and voter manipulation 
on social media, and software that automates criminal sentencing, loan 
approval, hiring decisions, and so on (Williams, 2019b; Spiel et al., 2019; 
Buolamwini & Gebru, 2018; Eubanks, 2018; Noble, 2018; Asaro, 2016; 
Angwin et al., 2016; Benjamin, 2016). Given these realities, how can we 
trust that policies which center the “human” will also center us? It is 
difficult to see how technologies used to expand, reinforce, and make 
more profitable these pervasive institutions of violence and oppression 
could operate against a shared background of values common to all 
humanity. Rosi Braidotti quotes Tony Davies: “All humanisms, until now, 
have been imperial” (Braidotti, 2013, p. 15). From this perspective, the 
attempt to signal a commitment to integrity by appeal to the category 
“human” reads as more of the empty ethics-washing that has come to 
characterize the field (Metzinger, 2019). 
 
Absent from these human-centered proposals is any engagement with the 
decades of sustained scholarship in feminist, postcolonial, and critical race 
theory  (Jackson, 2020; Deckha, 2012; Mills, 2011; Hayles, 2008; Said, 
2004; D. Haraway, 1989, 1991), animal rights and environmental ethics 
(Belcourt, 2015; Gaard, 2011; Steiner, 2010; Katz, 2000); STS, HCI, and 
design theory (Thomas et al., 2017; Kera et al., 2009; Latour, 2003), and 
related fields that have developed systematic critiques of 
anthropocentrism and the politics of the “human.” Among the important 
insights of this diverse literature is the recognition that a superficial appeal 
to inclusive universalism can be used to justify and provide cover for 
narrowly self-serving, exclusive, or imperialist practices (Khader, 2018; 
Giraldo, 2016). As Charles Mills puts the point, “historically and still 
currently, most humans were not and are not socially recognized persons, 
or, more neatly and epigrammatically put: most persons are non-persons” 
(Mills, 2011). Confronting such duplicitous ideologies presents difficult 
conceptual, rhetorical, and practical challenges, suggesting that care 
should be taken in the use of universalizing language if it is used at all. 
The uncritical deployment in AI policy of human-centered rhetoric as a 
pretense to ethical integrity speaks not only as a tacit endorsement of its 
imperialist undertones, but more loudly as utter disregard for those 
scholars and activists who have been consistently engaged with the 
“human” as a normative ground. 
 
This paper seeks to correct these omissions and provoke the AI 
community to adopt a more reflective, informed, and critical perspective on 
the way human-centered rhetoric can function as a cheap proxy for ethical 
integrity. To these ends we engage the work of Joanna Bryson, prominent 
scholar, public speaker, and policy consultant in AI ethics, and author of 
the paper “Robots should be slaves” (Bryson, 2010a). In this and several 
other essays (Bryson & Kime, 1998, 2011; Bryson, Diamantis, & Grant, 
2017; Bryson, 2011, 2018a, 2018b), Bryson and colleagues construct a 
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vision of the ethical use of AI that renders these technologies as an 
explicit social underclass modelled after the historical institutions of 
slavery and domestic servitude. This rendering of the “human” as 
categorically dominant over artificial agents in virtue of our kind is the 
target of this analysis of “human supremacy.” Reading Bryson through 
recent scholarship on posthumanism and anthropocentrism, and 
especially through the lens of critical race and postcolonial studies, does 
not merely raise a set of objections to the tone and content of her work. It 
also offers a case study on the relative ease with which ideologies of 
oppression can develop from what might seem like an innocuous ethical 
commitment that puts the “human” first. 
 
Bryson is by no means alone in her explicit endorsement of the 
institutionalized slavery of machines (Petersen, 2007, 2012). Oscar Wilde 
anticipates the position as early as 1891: “Human slavery is wrong, 
insecure, and demoralising. On mechanical slavery, on the slavery of the 
machine, the future of the world depends” (Wilde, 1891). Ruha Benjamin 
presents a striking example of human supremacist rhetoric in an article 
from Mechanix Illustrated from 1965 that predicts “Slavery will be back! 
We’ll all have personal slaves again… Don’t be alarmed. We mean robot 
‘slaves’.” Benjamin notes that “It goes without saying that readers, so 
casually hailed as “we,” are not the descendants of those whom Lincoln 
freed” (Benjamin, 2019, p. 56). This comment helps locate the matrix of 
oppression, artificial agency, and group identity addressed in this critical 
evaluation of human supremacy. Benjamin continues:  
 
For those of us who believe in a more egalitarian notion of power, of collective 
empowerment without domination, how we imagine our relation to robots offers a 
mirror for thinking through and against race as technology. (2019, p. 56ff)  
 
This paper is presented in solidarity with those who share this commitment 
to collective empowerment.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. We begin by introducing the term 
“human supremacy” as it appears in the animal advocacy literature, and 
we take on the conceptual and interpretive challenges the term invites in 
its application to AI ethics. We go on to sketch Bryson’s human-centered 
approach to AI ethics as a paradigm case of human supremacy, 
addressing its theoretical grounding and consequences for policy. With 
Bryson’s views unpacked, we then turn to two resources to understand 
them: Rosi Braidotti’s discussion of reactionary posthumanism in Martha 
Nussbaum, and the critique of ideal theory in Charles Mills and Serene 
Khader. This scaffolding helps uncover the ideological and institutional 
foundations for Bryson’s position, and points to an alternative approach 
that emphasizes the nonideal conditions within which subjectivity and 
community operate. The paper closes with reflections on the risks of 
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human supremacist politics in a posthuman age, specifically concerning 
the classification of agents by type. 
 
 
Human supremacy in animal justice and AI ethics 
 
Human supremacy is the view that human interests ought to be 
systematically privileged over other interests as a matter of public policy. 
The term derives from activist-scholars in animal rights and environmental 
ethics (Crist, 2017; Lupinacci, 2015; Steiner, 2010) who object to 
anthropocentric policies that neglect the welfare and integrity of nonhuman 
biological and ecological systems. Similar terms can be found in, for 
instance, Mary Midgley’s “human chauvinism” or “exclusive humanism” 
(Midgley, 2003). However, the term “human supremacy” draws on a 
deliberately provocative analogy to white supremacy, that pervasive 
system of racist structural power and oppression which systematically 
privileges the interests of people identified as “white” relative to people 
who, for various historical and sociopolitical reasons, are not so identified. 
Analogously, human supremacy names those practices which 
systematically privilege the “human” relative to the “nonhuman.” The 
ideologies of oppression and abject domination indicated by the term 
“supremacy” cannot be easily reduced to the prejudiced beliefs or 
attitudes that some individuals or groups hold towards others. The 
vocabulary of oppression highlights the structural, institutional, and 
material realities within which some social groups are systematically 
attacked, exploited, and marginalized relative to others. (Frye, 1983; 
Young, 1988).  
 
The problematic analogy between white supremacy and the racist 
oppression of humans on one hand, and human supremacy and the 
anthropocentric oppression of animals and other nonhumans on the other, 
has been addressed in critical race studies, critical animal studies, and 
ecofeminist literatures (Nocella et al., 2015; Nocella, 2012; Gaard, 2011; 
Wise, 2005; Armstrong, 2002). These sources emphasize that the 
comparison between oppressed people and industrial livestock is deeply 
insensitive to the history of racialized chattel slavery that operated on this 
analogy.4 Animal studies scholar Anthony Nocella (2012) argues that 
 
4 Reacting to a series of photo campaigns from the People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals (PETA) with titles like “Are animals the new slaves?” and “Holocaust on your 
plate,” white anti-racist author Tim Wise explains this insensitivity by appeal to the white 
privilege of many animal rights activists:  
 
That PETA can’t understand what it means for a black person to be compared to 
an animal, given a history of having been thought of in exactly those terms, isn’t 
the least bit shocking. After all, the movement is perhaps the whitest of all 
progressive or radical movements on the planet, for reasons owing to the privilege 
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members of the animal advocacy movement rarely share a common 
experience of oppression, either as a community or with the animals they 
advocate for. This points to an important disanalogy between the 
(nonhuman) animal rights movement and the ongoing struggles against 
racist, sexist, ableist, and colonialist oppression. A nonhuman animal 
might maul its captor and escape its bonds, but that animal cannot engage 
directly in political resistance without animal activists working on their 
behalf. The resistance to the oppression of humans stands in stark 
contrast; Nocella quotes political prisoner Jalil Muntaqim, “We are our own 
liberators” (Nocella, 2012, p. 148). 
 
To avoid the “white savior complex” the phrase “animal liberation” implies, 
Nocella suggests thinking instead of “animal justice,” and appreciating 
how interconnected structures of oppression and domination reveals that 
“fighting for human animal rights is fighting for nonhuman animal rights” 
(Nocella, 2012, p. 150). Greta Gaard (2011) points to efforts in ecofeminist 
thought that foreground the intersections of race, class, and ecology, for 
example in, “industrialized  animal  food  production  and  its  reliance  on  
undocumented  immigrant  workers  (who  risk  deportation  if  they  report  
their  hazardous  workplace  conditions)” (Gaard, 2011, p. 36). This does 
not imply that human rights and animal advocacy work are always in 
alignment. Zakiyyah Iman Jackson notes that,  
 
animal advocacy projects that seek greater legal protection for the Great Apes 
and more strenuous criminal prosecution for those who transgress protective 
laws find themselves at odds with impoverished peoples in African nations that 
have been burdened by World Bank and IMF policies. (Jackson, 2020, p. 15ff) 
 
Nocella offers several recommendations to integrate the work of animal 
advocacy more deeply with other struggles to end oppression, including 
centering the work of people of color who are engaged in social justice 
and animal advocacy; challenging one’s own whiteness, domination, and 
elitism;5 and resisting the comparison between forms of oppression “if that 
 
one must possess in order to focus on animal rights as opposed to, say, surviving 
oneself from institutional oppression. (Wise, 2005, as quoted in Nocella, 2012) 
 
5 While I do not identify as white, I am a straight cisgendered able-bodied man with an 
education and a full-time teaching position at a public technical institute, and these 
advantages put me in a position of privilege relative to many oppressed and marginalized 
people. These advantages have allowed me the opportunity to address the social status 
of artificial agents as a philosophical and scholar-activist project, an opportunity made 
possible by the very same social structures that are systematically targeting Latinx 
members of my communities in Southern California for detention and deportation. I would 
like to acknowledge that this research was done during the tragic expansion of for-profit 
concentration camps at the border that have kept innocent people in terrible conditions 
and have separated thousands of children from their parents. Revisions for this article 
were completed during a pandemic, and amidst worldwide Black Lives Matter 
demonstrations in protest of police violence and systematic injustice.  
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comparison is not met with action, and is not examined for the purpose of 
understanding the oppressor” (Nocella, 2012, p. 152).  
 
Nocella’s advice applies equally well to the potentially insensitive 
comparisons the term “human supremacy” invites in the context of artificial 
agents and AI.6 It is important to keep in mind that the discourse around 
the “human” arises in the AI literature at the same time as egregious 
ethical failures in both industry and public policy that disproportionately 
impact the lives of people who have already been marginalized and 
exploited by racism and white supremacy, sexism and patriarchy, 
transphobia, ableism, nationalist xenophobia, capitalism, and other forms 
of systemic oppression (Keyes et al., 2019; Bardzell & Bardzell, 2015; 
Irani et al., 2010). A critical inquiry into the institutionalized abjection that 
develops around the use and deployment of robots and AI, or what might 
be called critical robot studies, addresses a particularly salient form of 
anthropocentric ideology, and aims to resist its careless use in the 
defense of systemically oppressive practices in AI ethics. This approach 
does not imply a comparison between the (potential) experiences of 
artificial agents and the multiple intersecting forms of discrimination and 
oppression faced by black and brown people, women and LGBTQIA+ 
people, and other marginalized groups under white supremacy, 
cisheteronormative patriarchy, neoliberal colonialism, and other 
entrenched systems of power. Nocella says, “All suffering is different and 
is based on individual experience even if the oppressive tactic is the 
same” (Nocella, 2012, p. 147). We do not hope to speak on behalf of or 
“liberate” robots, nor to merely appropriate the language and culture of 
activist movements. Instead, we seek to contribute to the struggle against 
all forms of oppression by examining one manifestation of a tactic that 
impacts humans and nonhumans alike; namely, the political classification 
of agents by type, and the systematic privileging of groups based on 
essentializing, hierarchical ontologies (Jackson, 2020; Benjamin, 2016; 
Braun, 2014; Reardon, 2009).  
 
We adapt the term “human supremacy” from the context of animal and 
environmental advocacy to the field of AI ethics in order to name a 
nefarious mode of classification politics that situates the “human” as the 
focus of systemic privilege. While humanist or anthropocentric framings 
can be found throughout the AI ethics literature, our project is not 
condemn the vocabulary of the “human” wherever it appears; as Jackson 
says, “To render one’s humanity provisional, where the specter of 
 
6 The term “AI” and “robot” are used here to include all technologies addressed under the 
labels artificial intelligence, machine learning, and robotics, including autonomous 
vehicles, drones, and weapons, IoT and “smart” appliances, social media bots and other 
artificial software agents (anthropomorphic or not), expert systems and efficient database 
management architectures, and related technologies. The vocabulary and taxonomy for 
identifying and distinguishing between artificial agents playing various roles remains 
unsettled. 
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nullification looms large, is precisely the work that racism does” (Jackson, 
2020, p. 16). Rather, our goal is to uncover the ideologies of oppression 
and abject domination that often informs the appeal to humanism as an 
ethical ground. Used in this way, the term retains some of its original 
meaning and use. Nevertheless, the critique of human supremacy in AI 
presents several unique challenges that distinguish it from the animal 
advocacy case. One difference is that while anthropocentrism in 
environmental policy can be subtle and may require critical or interpretive 
efforts to “recognize” (Lupinacci, 2015), in AI human supremacy is often 
overt, with the “human” presented as an explicit basis for political alliance, 
as we will see in Bryson’s view. To this extent, the term “human 
supremacy” functions less as an accusation of covert oppressive behavior 
by analogy to racial oppression, and more as a precise description of an 
ideology framed in its proponent’s own terms.7 
 
It is worth considering why human-centered politics is so broadly 
welcomed in AI ethics, despite the otherwise dismal status of the “human” 
in the political climate of the Anthropocene (Ellis, 2015; D. J. Haraway, 
2016; Lewis & Maslin, 2015). The literature discusses two justifications 
which have, on their surface, relatively little to do with each other: the well-
established international policy framework of human rights (Latonero, 
2018; Risse, 2018), and the presumed metaphysical non-agency of 
artifacts like machines and pieces of software (Boden et al., 2017; Fossa, 
2018). These justifications will be addressed in later sections through the 
lens of Braidotti’s critical posthumanism and Mills’s critique of ideal theory. 
However, one version of the second justification should be addressed 
before moving from the animal ethics literature.  
 
It is commonly argued that AI is neither biological nor alive, so cannot 
suffer like animals and other living creatures, and therefore cannot 
participate in a moral community in the relevant way to deserve moral 
consideration or critical advocacy. If animal advocacy is primarily 
motivated by animal suffering, and if robots cannot suffer, this would 
undermine the possibility that robots could stand in need of the sort of 
political activism seen in the animal advocacy movement. Such arguments 
can be resisted on several grounds. Environmentalists since at least Aldo 
Leopold’s Land ethic (1949) have emphasized the value of nonliving 
systems like the soil, water, and air that do not “suffer” in the experiential 
sense of animals with a nervous system, but which nevertheless are vital 
for the integrity of ecological communities, and so warrant a focal role in 
 
7 The vocabulary of “supremacy” has become popular tech jargon to indicate superiority 
in some practical domain, as with the so-called race to “quantum supremacy” (Arute et 
al., 2019). This “supremacist” framing pitting humans against bots can be seen regularly 
in AI discussions around competitive games, as with bots competing for “poker 
supremacy” (Gibney, 2017), or bots that challenge “human supremacy at chess” (Müller 
& Schaeffer, 2018). 
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our norms and practices (Konopka, 2013). Kate Darling notes that while 
the philosophical and ethical discussion of animal rights revolves around 
issues like pain and consciousness, “our laws indicate that these concerns 
are secondary when it comes to legal protections” (Darling, 2016, p. 17). 
Instead, Darling argues that laws tend to follow public attitudes towards 
animals that do not depend on biological differences, as with laws in the 
U.S. that protect horses but not cows from being killed and eaten, despite 
few biological differences that could justify this practice. Several scholars 
have noted how the emphasis on conscious experiences in AI privilege a 
Western European and predominantly Christian perspective on artifacts 
and their relationship to nature, ethics and society—a perspective that is 
not universally shared (Williams, 2019b; Gunkel, 2018a; Jones, 2015). 
Assuming this perspective marginalizes non-Western traditions that do not 
operate on an anthropocentric hierarchy of value, such as found in Shinto 
(Geraci, 2006), African and African diasporic (Jackson, 2020; Metz, 2017; 
Horsthemke, 2017), and First Nations (Pierotti & Wildcat, 2000) 
philosophy. Finally, there are the ongoing discriminatory practices in which 
biological factors are treated as scientific justification for institutional 
oppression based on race, gender identity, sexual orientation, disability, or 
other essentializing characteristics (Jackson, 2020; Appiah, 2018). Taken 
together, these considerations suggest that biological factors alone should 
not be treated as prima facie justification for the exclusion of artificial 
agents from the moral community.  
 
Nevertheless, the literature on “robot rights” is overwhelmingly 
preoccupied with whether robots have internal states sufficiently “like ours” 
to warrant social status and legal recognition (Wittkower, forthcoming; 
Danaher, 2019; Williams, 2019a, 2018; Gunkel, 2018b; Schwitzgebel & 
Garza, 2015).8 The hypercritical focus on the machine’s experiences (or 
lack thereof) points to another important distinction between animals and 
AI: artificial agents already participate in a variety of sociopolitical contexts 
that were formerly the exclusive domain of humans. There already exist 
vibrant online communities building, publishing, and critically assessing 
the work of bots that write poetry and fiction, create digital images and 
videos, compose music, and produce other forms of ‘artistic’ expression 
(Hertzmann, 2019; Oliveira, 2017; Compton et al., 2017; Gilani et al., 
2017). Perhaps most well-known are the artificial “influencers” like Lil 
Miquela who model fashion brands to millions of followers on social media 
 
8 These concerns predate Turing’s (1950) proposed “imitation game”. Turing attempts to 
respond to these concerns by directing questions away from the machine’s “experience” 
and towards the actual conditions of its social performances, including our reactions to 
them (Estrada, 2018; Hayles, 2008). Notice how the systematic comparison between 
human and machine experiences suggested by the more popular reading of Turing’s test 
runs afoul of Nocella’s recommendation to avoid comparing experiences. This is not to 
suggest that Turing’s test is morally wrong, but to notice that it creates social 
circumstances that are especially hostile to the possibility of recognizing and respecting 
artificial agents (Hayes & Ford, 1995). 
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(Blanton & Carbajal, 2019). These digital communities highlight the 
already overlapping sociopolitical circumstances of human and artificial 
agents, which are not predicated on some shared biological or 
evolutionary background, nor on shared experiences or conscious states, 
but more concretely on the material and institutional realities within which 
human and nonhuman agents “share existence” (Latour, 2003). Just as 
the shared material realities of oppression provide a framework for 
collaboration among resistance movements addressing both human and 
nonhuman animal interests—despite important differences in the history 
and experiences motivating this work—this very same framework for 
collaboration provides resources to resist biocentrism, anthropocentrism, 
and other essentializing hierarchies as they appear in the discourse 
around robots, AI, and artificial agency, despite important differences 
between human and artificial agents.  
  
Moreover, unlike nonhuman animals, it is reasonable to expect the 
capacities of artificial agents will continue to advance rapidly on relatively 
short timescales, at least within some domains. The possibility for radical 
near-term changes in the agential capacities of robots suggests their 
sociopolitical status will likewise remain unsettled. Peter Asaro notes, “At 
some point in the future, robots might simply demand their rights” (Asaro, 
2006, p. 12). However, while articulating these demands may require 
fundamental changes in the capacities of artificial agents, it will also 
require an ethical and interpretive change in our capacities as a society to 
respect such demands as potentially legitimate political acts. These 
changes in the social imagination don’t require that we wait for 
technologies “worthy” of basic consideration. Alan Turing articulated this 
perspective in his plea for “fair play for machines” (Turing, 1947; Estrada, 
2018a) just as the first general purpose computers inspired by his work 
were being constructed in research labs. If the kind of critical self-
reflection required to advocate on behalf of machines was available to 
Turing, surely it is available to us as well. 
 
 
Human supremacy in Bryson’s AI ethics 
 
Joanna Bryson’s contributions to the AI ethics literature, especially the 
article “Robots should be slaves” (Bryson, 2010; henceforth RSBS), 
provides a useful case study for the critical examination of human 
supremacist ideology in AI ethics. RSBS is notable (though, as discussed 
earlier, hardly unique) for its unfortunate invocation of the historical 
institution of slavery as a model for AI ethics, where “robots should be 
servants you own” (p. 3). Bryson would later apologize for this framing 
(Bryson, 2015). Still, the set of considerations, drawn mostly from 
evolutionary psychology, that lead to proposing slavery as a model for AI 
ethics continues to inform Bryson’s work not only as a scholar but also as 
9
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a high-level policy consultant for both government and industry. This 
section will present a critical reading of RSBS and related work, to shed 
light on the motivation and perspective they develop and the influence 
they have had on AI ethics discourse and industry policy. To be clear, 
Bryson’s work is not singled out for being egregiously problematic or 
offensive. On the contrary, Bryson clearly articulates a mainstream liberal 
humanism that is widely endorsed in the field, for which she has received 
broad support and recognition. Given the prominence of these views, it is 
important to take seriously the ways in which they rely on or perhaps even 
require the logic and essentializing hierarchies of white supremacy. In this 
section we detail Bryson’s straightforward embrace of the logic of 
institutionalized slavery in RSBS and related papers to address these 
deeper themes in the AI ethics discourse. 
 
Written nearly a decade before RSBS, Bryson’s earliest contribution to AI 
ethics scholarship is the coauthored conference paper, “Just another 
artifact: Ethics and the empirical experience of AI” (Bryson & Kime, 1998) 
which lays out many of the elements of her considered view. An edited 
version of this paper is published in 2011 under the title “Just an artifact: 
Why machines are perceived as moral agents” (Bryson & Kime, 2011), 
suggesting some continuity of views over this time, the period during 
which RSBS was written, presented, and published. As such, these 
papers give insight into Bryson’s early views on AI ethics independent of 
the overt analogy with slavery developed in RSBS. Bryson & Kime’s 
motivation in these papers is to address certain “exaggerated fears” 
(Bryson & Kime, 1998, p. 385) from Vernor Vinge and other early 
proponents of the Singularity hypothesis, who predict that computers 
might soon surpass human intelligence and take over the world (Vinge, 
1993). Bryson & Kime argue that these misplaced fears arise from an 
“over-identification with machines,” a mistake they say is “symptomatic of 
a larger problem—a general confusion about the nature of humanity and 
the role of ethics in society” (p. 385). What is the nature of humanity and 
the role of ethics in society? The authors claim that “ethics has evolved as 
a mechanism of human social cohesion, without which society 
disintegrates” (p. 386). They claim the primary mechanism driving social 
cohesion is empathy: “we care for people or objects that we would feel 
badly for if they were hurt or damaged” (p. 386, emphasis in original). This 
feeling of empathy in turn creates a sense of identification with the target 
of our concern. The relative strength of this identification generates an 
individual’s hierarchy of ethical obligation, “with ourselves and our families 
tending to be at the top, followed by our neighbours and other people with 
whom we acknowledge commonality” (p. 386). Bryson & Kime infer from 








In the case of the Singularity theorists, Bryson & Kime argue that the 
mechanisms of social identification have been misapplied to machines. 
They explain this confusion by appeal to our tendency to distinguish 
ourselves from animals—itself grounded in the evolutionary drive to 
empathetic social cohesion. “To form a human society, one needs to value 
the lives of humans in the community over the lives of other animals” (p. 
386). They argue that a mistaken over-identification with machines “lead[s] 
to an undervaluing of the emotional and aesthetic in our society. 
Consequences include an unhealthy neglect and denial of emotional 
experiences” (p. 387). They identify two dangers of over-identification: “we 
may believe the machine to be a participant in our society, which might 
seriously confuse our understanding of them,” and “we may over-value the 
machine when making our own ethical judgments and balancing our own 
obligations” (p. 387). They claim these dangers are not unique to AI, and 
that all artifacts have “the potential for misuse, either through carelessness 
or malevolence, by the people who control them.” (p. 385) They dismiss 
any view that values AI, “to the exclusion of our own existence” as 
“nihilism” (p. 390). The most substantial citation offered to support these 
claims is Lakoff & Johnson's Metaphors we live by (1980). 
 
There are many reasons for finding these views unsatisfying as an ethical 
framework. The direct line drawn between evolutionary psychology and 
ethical obligation is underdeveloped and theoretically implausible (Street, 
2006). The relationship proposed between empathy and social 
identification is, at best, oversimplified (Jenkins, 2014). The view that 
artifacts are dangerous only through their misuse or abuse by humans is 
known in the philosophy of technology literature as “technological 
neutrality” or “instrumentalism,” (Kaplan, 2009), a problematic view as a 
policy position in the high tech industry (Reed, 2007; Koops, 2006; 
Winner, 1980). However, it is not our goal to present a full scholarly 
critique of a conference paper from twenty years ago. Instead, our goal is 
to trace the development of a view that results in the explicit endorsement 
of slavery as an ethical framework for managing robots. For our purposes, 
the most relevant features of Bryson’s position in these early papers are 
the claims that identification drives moral obligation, and that identifying 
with AI is a mistake.  
 
Neither claim is compelling. On purely psychological grounds, social 
identification is unlikely to build models that are consistent enough to 
serve as a basis for moral reasoning. Jenkins (2014) introduces the 
psychology of social identity by explaining,  
 
our classificatory models of self and others are multidimensional, unlikely to be 
internally consistent, and may not easily map onto each other. Hierarchies of 
collective identification may conflict with hierarchies of individual identification, 
which means that the following might make complete interactional sense: I hate all 
As; you are an A; but you are my friend. Taken together, these points suggest that 
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categorical imperatives are unlikely to be a sufficient guide on their own, and that 
the ability to discriminate between others in subtle and fine-grained ways is an 
everyday necessity. (p. 6) 
 
Bryson’s later work emphasizes that moral systems should be “coherent” 
(Bryson, 2018a, p. 202), but this would be difficult to achieve if morality 
were grounded on empathetic identification alone. Given the complex 
psychological and political realities involved in the production of social 
identity, it seems unlikely that “over-identification” (with machines or 
anything else) is a serious threat to the social order. Nevertheless, Bryson 
& Kime (1998) take the cultivation of appropriate identification practices 
towards machines be a central concern in AI ethics, one which the 
proposal in RSBS and later works aim to address. 
 
For the sake of argument, suppose we accept Bryson’s first claim. If 
identification is the root of obligation, then the psychological fact that we 
identify with machines would suggest some prima facie obligations to 
those machines. What justifies the claim that such identification is 
inappropriate or mistaken? Bryson & Kime (1998) recognize that ethical 
systems can be “somewhat arbitrary,” and that in novel circumstances (as 
with AI), we are “to some extent free to create a new ethical standard” (p. 
389). So why not take the supposed identification with machines as 
evidence of evolving moral obligations? The authors defend their 
resistance to adopting new ethical standards for machines with two 
responses, one they describe as “technical,” the other “ethical.” Their 
technical response argues that people tend to overestimate the capacities 
of machines. Their ethical response argues that we already face a 
resource allocation problem with other artifacts like “fine art and political 
institutions,” (p. 387) where investments might draw resources away from 
more pressing human interests.  
 
Neither response addresses the issue at stake, which is how to decide 
which identification practices (and which identities) are appropriate and 
which are mistaken. As to the technical response: we identify not just with 
other people, but with sports teams and brand names and superheroes 
and all manner of things. The fact that we make errors about the 
capacities of these entities says very little about whether our identification 
with them is appropriate or not. When fans of an underperforming sports 
team are unrealistically optimistic about their performance in tonight’s 
game, this is not evidence that their identification with the team is 
mistaken, inappropriate, or symptomatic of deeper psychological or 
conceptual failures. The ethics of identification simply are not settled by 
the accuracy of the predictions those identities generate.  
 
This technical response is confusing, given that their proposal contains 
better resources for addressing the concern: specifically, the evolutionary 
drive to “social cohesion.” On this supposedly ethics-grounding biological 
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imperative, the precise nature of the ethical system doesn’t matter so 
much as its overall impact on social stability and (ultimately) the 
reproductive success of the species. This would seem to raise an open 
empirical question: does empathizing with machines make for a more 
stable social order? Or perhaps better as an engineering and design 
question: how do we design more stable social systems through the 
natural empathy people have towards machines? (Wittkower 2020; 
Carpenter, 2016; Darling, 2015) By insisting on a principled basis that the 
identification with machines is a conceptual mistake, Bryson & Kime 
(1998) cut off these possibilities and effectively limit the ethical discourse 
in AI to controlling the frequency and impact of these “anthropomorphic 
fallacies” (p. 390). In this spirit they claim, “The issue of forming identity is 
now more than ever an issue for public education,” (p. 391) implying a 
need for institutionalized policies to control how social identities are 
formed and who we identify with. This interest in controlling the 
identification practices and empathetic responses people might form 
towards machines is a central pillar of the argument developed in RSBS.  
 
Bryson & Kime’s (1998) second “ethical” response reveals an important 
assumption in Bryson’s ethical perspective: that the evolutionary dynamics 
of obligation are often zero sum, and that developing new obligations 
towards AI would entail fewer obligations to and empathy with humans, 
animals, and society generally. The risk is not simply that we mistakenly 
identify with AI, but that we identify with AI at the expense of identifying 
with humans; if obligation is zero sum, these identities are necessarily in 
competition. Since they assume that social cohesion depends on our 
empathy and obligations towards other humans, the over-identification 
with AI is not merely inappropriate or distasteful; it is a direct threat to the 
social order. The authors emphasize that this threat is not unique to AI, 
pointing to the resources used to maintain the Mona Lisa that could be 
used instead for people in need. Restating this argument, Bryson & Kime 
are claiming that fine art threatens social cohesion (and ultimately our 
evolutionary success!) by potentially generating more empathy and 
resources for art than we have for other people. Their criticism of AI is that 
it might pose the same threat to social cohesion as posed by fine art. One 
might have thought that art provides a clear example in which 
identification and obligation are not zero-sum, where we might be a more 
stable, cohesive, and empathetic society because of the resources we 
invest in public art. But for Bryson & Kime, producing fine art is a social 
liability, a cost we accept, like car accidents, because of the pleasure and 
convenience those artifacts bring us. This zero-sum perspective on 
obligation is another major pillar of Bryson’s reasoning in RSBS and later 
essays. 
 
“Robots should be slaves” (Bryson, 2010a) was published as a book 
chapter in 2010 after being solicited for a conference on “Artificial 
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Companions in Society” at Oxford in 2007. Its publication coincides with a 
burst of papers and conference presentations with titles like “Building 
persons is a choice” (Bryson, 2009), “Why robot nannies probably won’t 
do much psychological damage” (Bryson, 2010b), and “AI/robots should 
not be considered moral agents” (Bryson, 2011). Together with the revised 
“Just an artifact” (Bryson & Kime, 2011), these papers all expand on the 
themes developed in “Just Another Artifact” (1998), emphasizing the 
ethical risks posed by the over-identification with AI. Bryson’s work in this 
period is not aimed at the subjugation of robots as such. Instead, her work 
tries to correct what she sees as the conceptual confusion generated by 
an inappropriate identification with machines, a mistake propagated by 
science fiction narratives and self-described “futurists” whose doomsday 
scenarios had become popular in tech journalism around this time. Bryson 
recommends against the use of anthropomorphic robots in industrial 
settings, and for policies that establish an unambiguous ethical hierarchy 
that situates responsibility and ethical priority with humans over machines. 
In 2010, Bryson participated in a joint EPSRC/AHRC (Engineering and 
Physical Sciences Research Council/Arts and Humanities Research 
Council) retreat with industry leaders and policy experts in the UK. This 
retreat produced a set of “Principles of Robotics” (Boden et al., 2017), 
which reinforces Bryson’s themes concerning the identification with 
machines. Of the five rules laid out in the document, the first four largely 
concern what robots are:  
 
1: Robots are multi-use tools…,  
2: Humans, not robots, are responsible agents…,  
3: Robots are products…,  
4: Robots are manufactured artifacts… (Boden et al., 2017, p. 125ff) 
 
The principles propose industrial policies that clearly distinguish between 
the capacities of robots and humans, advocating a purely instrumental 
perspective on the former, and exclusively restricting the discussion of 
agency and responsibility to the latter. As a policy document, these 
principles give the misleading impression that the primary ethical risks 
presented by industrial applications of AI and robotics are ontological 
confusions over their agential status.  
 
The rationale driving RSBS can now be brought into focus. Bryson’s 
proposal takes for granted not only that humans should not be treated as 
slaves, but also that no one would identify or empathize with slaves. For 
Bryson, the “slave” is quintessentially an inhuman “other,” an archetype 
that is characteristically beyond the scope of moral consideration or 
empathetic identification. By calling robots “slaves,” and by treating the 
categorical distinctions between humans and robots with the same moral 
weight given to the distinction between humans and slaves, Bryson hopes 
to counteract the excessive empathy we might feel with robots through the 
attitude of abject disregard we “should” feel towards slaves. The call for 
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robot slavery directly answers Bryson’s concern across several papers to 
establish rigid identity hierarchies that formalize the ethical non-status of 
machines. In RSBS, Bryson repeats earlier claims that “our identity 
confusion results in somewhat arbitrary assignments of empathy” (Bryson, 
2010a, p. 4), and lists a set of costs for both individuals and institutions 
associated with the over-identification with AI (p. 5). Bryson describes 
“being too generous with personhood” as a “moral hazard” (p. 7). She 
rehearses the zero-sum reasoning,9 arguing that “humans have only a 
finite amount of time and attention for forming social relationships” (p. 5). 
While Bryson recognizes that the costs of identification “could be 
negative,” she doesn’t spend much time discussing the social benefits of 
empathetic identification with machines, or how to design technologies 
that maximize these benefits.  
 
Instead, Bryson uses the perceived costs to motivate what she calls the 
“correct metaphor” for robotics: that “robots should be servants you own” 
(p. 3). She says, “communicating the model of robot-as-slave is the best 
way both to get full utility from these devices and to avoid the moral 
hazards” (p. 8). RSBS lists “the fundamental claims of the paper” as: 
 
1. Having servants is good and useful, provided no one is dehumanized. 
2. A robot can be a servant without being a person. 
3. It is right and natural for people to own robots. 
4. It would be wrong to let people think that robots are persons. (p. 3) 
 
As the list suggests, Bryson’s concern for dehumanization is mostly an 
afterthought. She says, “Surely dehumanization is only wrong when it’s 
applied to someone who really is human?” (p. 2). Bryson goes on to briefly 
discuss the history of domestic labor in British villages from 1574–1821 in 
a positive light, claiming that roughly 30% of households employed 
servants. She justifies this practice by appeal to the inadequacies of an 
unpaid gendered division of labor, saying, “Where wives and other kin 
were not available to devote their full time to these tasks, outside 
 
9 Bryson et al. (2017) recognizes the potential problems with zero-sum ethical reasoning, 
but they appeal to it anyway, saying  
 
While not always a zero-sum game, sometimes extending the class of legal 
persons can come at the expense of the interests of those already within it. In the 
past, creating new legal persons has sometimes lead to asymmetries and 
corruptions such as entities that are accountable but unfunded, or fully-financed 
but unaccountable. (p. 275) 
 
Notice that this argument conflates the potential harms that result from the creation of new 
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employees were essential” (p. 8).10 Bryson reflects favorably on the 
current market for domestic labor, but argues,  
 
the most difficult thing with human servants is of course the fact that they really are 
humans, with their own goals, desires, interests, and expectations which they 
deserve to be able to pursue (p. 9). 
 
On the other hand, because robots “are wholly owned and designed by 
us” (p. 9), they cannot be frustrated, exploited, or made to suffer unless 
we deliberately design them with these capacities. So long as we aren’t 
anthropomorphizing robots in ways that cause confusion or excessive 
empathy, she says “owners should not have ethical obligations to robots… 
beyond those that society defines as common sense and decency, and 
would apply to any artifact” (p. 10). Bryson admits we have ethical 
obligations concerning robots, about their safe operation and so on, but 
we have no obligations to the robots themselves. Since robots are not 
moral agents, destroying a robot is ethically equivalent to the destruction 
of any property. In one of the more frustrating passages (p. 8), Bryson 
suggests that people who aren’t comfortable with the metaphor of slavery 
might instead adopt the perspective of extended mind theory (Clark & 
Chalmers, 1998), where our tools are understood as extensions of our 
own capacities. Bryson doesn’t consider that extended mind theory 
encourages us to identify strongly with our machines (Ahuvia, 2005), or 
how this might be inconsistent with her proposal for robots as slaves.  
 
It should go without saying that the appeal to institutionalized slavery and 
servitude as “good and useful, … right and natural” is profoundly 
insensitive and simply in poor taste. It also highlights a deep theoretical 
failure in Bryson’s ethics. Just as with the Mechanix Illustrated comic from 
1965 quoted earlier by Ruha Benjamin, Bryson takes for granted that the 
public would identify with slave owners rather than slaves, and with the 
30% of the British who hired domestic servants, rather than the 70% from 
whom they were hired. These assumptions speak to the substantial 
challenges involved in grounding ethical policy in the collective 
construction of social identity. Although Bryson makes token gestures to 
recognize the historical cruelty of racialized slavery, she does not consider 
how the metaphor of slavery might be interpreted by those who identify 
more with slaves rather than with slaveholders. She also fails to consider 
how a defense of slavery as a political institution might present a greater 
hazard to the moral imagination than an overidentification with robots. 
Fundamentally, Bryson does not think the problem with slavery is the 
ideology of domination and oppression it represents; the problem with 
slavery is that we were enslaving the wrong things.  
 
 
10 If they were essential, what did the other 70% do? 
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RSBS has received substantial scholarly attention in the AI ethics 
literature (Agar, 2019; van Wynsberghe & Robbins, 2019; Gunkel, 2018b, 
2015; Frank & Nyholm, 2017; Musiał, 2017; Prescott, 2017; Rainey, 2016; 
Coeckelbergh, 2015; Neely, 2014). While much of this literature is critical 
of Bryson’s insensitive language, few engage her theoretical approach 
from the perspective of standpoint epistemology or critical race theory to 
reflect on the role that racialized hierarchies play in the AI ethics 
discourse. Consequently, the human supremacist framing developed in 
RSBS continues to find endorsement in the literature. For instance, 
Birhane & van Dijk recently state their “full agreement” with Bryson’s focus 
on human well-being in RSBS, and disagree only to the extent that “one 
cannot dehumanize something that wasn’t human to begin with” (Birhane 
& van Dijk, 2020). The primary lesson Bryson has drawn from this 
feedback is that “you cannot use the term ‘slave’ without invoking its 
human history” (Bryson, 2015). Bryson has apologized for her insensitive 
use of the word “slave,” but not for the oppressive ideology that language 
articulates, or the abject disregard it shows for those who do not share her 
identities or perspectives.  
 
Indeed, Bryson’s recent work continues to develop the central perspective 
of RSBS. While the explicit vocabulary of slavery has been dropped, the 
focus on institutionalized identification policies and anthropocentric 
ontologies remains. In “Of, for, and by the people: The legal lacuna of 
synthetic persons” (Bryson et al., 2017), Bryson claims the “the basic 
purposes of human legal systems” includes a principle that, “[s]hould 
equally weighty moral rights of two types of entity conflict, legal systems 
should give preference to the moral rights held by human beings” (p. 283). 
Note the tacit assumption that part of the basic purpose of human legal 
systems is to sort entities by type. Lest there remains any ambiguity in the 
character of Bryson’s position, she describes it as, “an uncontroversially 
light thumb on the scale in favor of human interests. Yes, this is 
speciesism” (p. 283). Since humans and machines are not distinct 
species, the term ‘speciesism’ is a misnomer; we suggest the term 
“human supremacy” as a more appropriate characterization of this 
position. In “No one should trust AI” (Bryson, 2018b), Bryson argues that 
trust is a relationship between peers, and since we aren’t peers with AI, 
“no one actually can trust AI” (para. 2, emphasis in original). In “Patiency 
is not a virtue: The design of intelligent systems and systems of ethics” 
(Bryson, 2018a), Bryson argues that “where possible there should be 
minimal restructuring of existing norms” (p. 17), and that making robots 
deserving of moral consideration “could in itself be construed as an 
immoral action” (p. 16). These papers consistently argue that human 
social cohesion is an evolutionary imperative that must be met with 
institutionalized hierarchies which systemically privilege the “human.” 
While the outright appeal to slavery has been suppressed, the logic of 
human supremacy has, if anything, become more pronounced.  
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In these papers, Bryson’s concern shifts from the overidentification with 
machines as such to the more indirect threat that malicious corporate 
actors could anthropomorphize machines to exploit both our empathetic 
biases and legal loopholes around personhood. While the ethics of 
corporate personhood is a well-placed concern, Bryson conflates this with 
the supposed challenges of anthropomorphism and over-identification, 
saying,  
 
For example, customers could be fooled into wasting resources needed by their 
children or parents on a robot, or citizens could be fooled into blaming a robot 
rather than a politician for unnecessary fatalities in warfare. A corporation could 
displace responsibility for its decision to use automation rather than human 
employment onto the automation itself, creating a legal lacuna—a set of far poorer, 
purely-synthetic entities set up to be held responsible for tax and legal liability (p. 
23). 
 
Outside of certain science fiction scenarios, it is not clear how these risks 
are related. Corporate personhood and liability law do not depend on the 
psychology of empathetic identification. Bryson does not point to any case 
where anthropomorphic robots have been used to evade legal liability or 
establish legal personhood. She does not explain how anthropocentric 
ontologies or restrictions on anthropomorphic robots would prevent 
corporate abuses of legal personhood. She takes for granted that human 
supremacist policies would protect all and only the “correct” moral agents. 
 
Bryson’s work in AI ethics extends beyond academic scholarship and 
coincides with her rise to prominence as a public speaker and high-level 
policy consultant. In 2017, Bryson was quoted calling the popular 
humanoid robot Sophia’s award of Saudi citizenship “bullshit” (Vincent, 
2017). The comment earned a public debate with Sophia creator David 
Hanson at CogX 2018 (Estrada, 2018a).11 In 2019, Bryson was selected 
to sit on the Advanced Technology External Advisory Council at Google 
(Johnson & Lichfield, 2019). This council drew controversy for the 
inclusion of Kay Coles James, president of the Heritage Foundation, a 
conservative think tank known for promoting regressive policies on 
immigration and LGBTQ rights (Knight, 2019). After an open letter from 
immigrant and LGBTQ tech workers condemning the council led to 
Google’s termination of the program, Bryson continued to defend the 
council and her participation in it (Bryson, 2019b). Bryson also defended 
James’s participation on the council, comparing the criticisms she and the 
council had received to “bullying and shunning” (Bryson, 2019a).  
 
 
11 The debate was initially marketed as between Bryson and Sophia the robot, until 
Bryson objected on social media, and Hanson agreed to take the robot’s place on stage. 
The debate itself largely concerned the virtues and risks of anthropomorphism in robotics. 
See Estrada (2018a). 
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Bryson has made clear that she does not share James’s political views. 
We do not raise this minor controversy here to smear Bryson by an 
indirect association with James’s foundation, but instead to reflect on how  
corporate tech giants like Google cater to entrenched political interests 
over the interests of people systemically marginalized by those politics. In 
this context, it is notable that Bryson’s public response to the controversy 
was to defend her work with James and Google over public outcry from 
the very communities they target. Given Bryson’s scholarly concern for the 
careful construction of social identities as a stalwart against corporate 
abuses, and the emphasis she gives to human interests as a unifying 
norm, one might be surprised to find her scolding public criticism in 
defense of corporations and the xenophobic bigots they woo. However, a 
close reading of Bryson’s work reveals a methodological interest she 
shares with both Google and the Heritage Foundation: the systematic 
identification and classification of agents into essentializing hierarchies for 
purposes of political control. The same white supremacist reasoning that 
motivates the Heritage Foundation to target immigrants and LGBTQ 
people as political scapegoats, and which Google and other corporations 
deploy for targeted advertising, surveillance, and policing (Cave, 2020), 
Bryson has adapted as an organizing framework for policy and ethics 
across the field of AI and robotics.  
 
As surveyed in the introduction, Bryson is not alone or unique in her 
explicit embrace of human supremacy as a moral framework. To some 
extent, Bryson was in the right place when the AI boom hit to find success 
in an industry and regulatory climate that was particularly receptive to the 
vision of human supremacy developed in her work. To address this 
broader milieu in which Bryson’s work finds success, we turn next to the 
work of Rosi Braidotti and Charles Mills. 
 
 
Reactionary posthumanism as ideal theory 
 
Bryson argues that humanity is in the grips of an identity crisis. If so, 
Braidotti’s framework of “the posthuman” (Braidotti, 2013) may help 
diagnose the problem. For Braidotti, posthumanism marks our historical 
condition, characterized not only by a “crisis of Humanism,” but also the 
active exploration of “alternative ways of conceptualizing the human 
subject” (p. 37). Braidotti identifies three strands of posthuman thought 
that trace out different responses to our posthuman condition: one, a 
critical posthumanism informed by anti-humanist philosophies of 
subjectivity found in critical theory (Braidotti, 1994, 2002; Foucault, 1977); 
second, an analytic posthumanism that develops through explorations of 
the human in science and technology studies (Roden, 2014; Verbeek, 
2005, 2011); and finally, a reactionary posthumanism for whom “the 
posthuman condition can be solved by restoring a humanist vision of the 
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subject” (Braidotti, 2013, p. 39). Analytic posthumanism would include, but 
is not limited to, the transhumanist perspectives that motivate Singularity 
theory in its many guises: as a science fiction plot device, as a 
bioengineering design approach, and as a conceptual posit in academic 
scholarship on future risks. In this sense, analytic posthumanism is an 
implicit target of Bryson’s criticisms of Singularity theory. However, a full 
critique of analytic posthumanism is beyond the scope of this paper. For 
our treatment of Bryson’s constructive views, this section will focus on 
Braidotti’s discussion of reactionary posthumanism.  
 
Braidotti associates reactionary posthumanism with Martha Nussbaum 
(1998, 2010) who, Braidotti argues, “defends the need for universal 
humanistic values as a remedy for the fragmentation and relativistic drift of 
our times” (Braidotti, 2013, p. 39). For Nussbaum, this fragmentation is a 
product of the socioeconomic condition of globalization, which threatens 
humanity through the reactionary “plagues” (p. 39) of ethnocentrism and 
xenophobic nationalism. According to Braidotti, Nussbaum believes that 
the solution to these threats is a cosmopolitan universalism informed by 
classical humanist ideals. Braidotti says that for Nussbaum, “abstract 
universalism is the only stance that is capable of providing solid 
foundations for moral values such as compassion and respect for others” 
(p. 39). Nussbaum acknowledges the problematic historical use of 
humanist ideals as a discriminatory or exclusive practice, and responds 
with a call for a neo-humanism that centers the subjectivity of experience. 
While Braidotti praises this nod to feminist critiques and methods, she 
argues that Nussbaum, “reattaches [subjectivity] to a universalistic belief 
in individualism, fixed identities, steady locations and moral ties that bind” 
(p. 39). Braidotti says that due to this “disembedded universalism, 
Nussbaum ends up being paradoxically parochial in her vision of what 
counts as the human… leaving no room for experimenting with new 
models of the self” (p. 39).  
For example, Braidotti describes Nussbaum’s defense of a liberal 
education (Nussbaum, 2010) as “elitist and nostalgic” (Braidotti, 2013, p. 
173), noting that by the time of its publication, the university had already 
been refigured in the market economy as a corporate structure (p. 150). 
Braidotti is not disagreeing with Nussbaum about the value of a liberal 
education as such, nor is she asserting the reactionary counter-ideal that 
liberal humanism is necessarily bad. Rather, her point is to recognize how 
the humanist ideals which ground Nussbaum’s defense are out of touch 
with the material and institutional realities which benefit from that defense. 
If universities are managed like for-profit corporations, this muddies the 
narrative of the liberal ideals that the university supposedly represents. 
Similarly, if the rhetoric of universalist humanism is used to protect narrow 
and exclusive practices, it undermines the apparent universal appeal of 
those ideals. In this way, Braidotti argues that Nussbaum’s nostalgia for 
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humanist ideals operates as a defense of the very practices that subvert 
them. 
Charles Mills’s (2005) critique of the ideology of “ideal theory” provides 
tools for thinking through this potentially confusing discursive situation. For 
Mills, “ideal theory” describes not just the use of idealizations, which to 
some extent cannot be avoided in theoretical discourse. Instead, ideal 
theory describes the tendency to rely on “idealization to the exclusion, or 
at least marginalization, of the actual” (p. 168). For instance, ideal theory 
might concern itself with how an ideal society would structure its basic 
institutions from an idealized “state of nature,” rather than addressing the 
actual social circumstances in which its institutions operate. Mills claims 
that ideal theory will typically employ assumptions that idealize human 
capacities, social institutions, and social ontologies in ways that “abstract 
away from relations of structural domination, exploitation, coercion, and 
oppression, which in reality, of course, will profoundly shape the ontology 
of those same individuals” (p. 168). Mills continues,  
It is obvious that ideal theory can only serve the interests of the privileged who, in 
addition—precisely because of that privilege (as bourgeois white males)—have an 
experience that comes closest to that ideal, and so experience the least cognitive 
dissonance between it and reality (p. 172). 
Restating the critique of Nussbaum in Mills’s terms, Braidotti argues that 
reactionary posthumanism embraces humanist ideals to the exclusion of 
the actual. It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess whether 
Braidotti’s criticisms are fair to Nussbaum’s views. What matters for our 
purposes is Braidotti’s analysis of how a reactionary embrace of humanist 
ideals in a posthuman context can operate on the ideology of ideal theory. 
The institutional realities of a corporatized university system have real 
consequences for the value of higher education, and this influence cannot 
be elided by appeal to the merits of classical humanist ideals. Mills 
explains that by “abstracting away from realities crucial to our 
comprehension of the actual workings of injustice in human interactions 
and social institutions” (p. 170), the reliance on ideal theory effectively 
guarantees that those ideals will never be achieved.  
Together, these analyses from Braidotti and Mills help to articulate the 
critical failures in Bryson’s ethics beyond the mere insensitivity of her 
language. Like Nussbaum’s, Bryson’s work can be read as an expression 
of reactionary posthumanism, responding to the contemporary crisis of 
humanism by asserting nostalgic, elitist ideals for traditional social 
institutions and ontologies, such as “servants are useful and good.” These 
ideals are themselves justified by idealized models of agency and social 
cognition, and they aim to minimize disruption of the existing social order, 
thereby protecting the systems of power that benefit from that order. 
Where Nussbaum sees ideals of cosmopolitan discourse in a liberal 
education, Bryson sees ideals of stability and clarity of identity in 
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institutionalized slavery and strict social hierarchies. Bryson presents 
herself as speaking on behalf of humanity’s interest broadly construed, 
when in fact her proposals showcase a narrow and privileged perspective 
that alienates those who don’t already share it. In so doing, she neglects 
the political and psychological realities within which humans and 
nonhumans share existence.  
These analyses also help clarify an interpretive issue in the present 
critique of human supremacy. Again, it is not our intention to condemn 
anthropocentrism in AI ethics based solely on an abstract analogy with 
white supremacy. The problem with human supremacy is not simply that it 
replicates a superficial hierarchy of structural oppression. Instead, the 
problem with human supremacy is how it operates as a defense of 
entrenched power and oppressive ideologies, in a context replete with 
examples of the systemic abuses of that power and the failures of those 
ideals. The ontological distinctions proposed between humans and 
machines are not simply modeled on traditional hierarchies of race and 
gender, they function to extend, legitimize, and calcify them within AI 
policy and legal theory. This is the fundamental risk of human supremacist 
ideology, and it should be recognizable as a risk no matter how one feels 
about anthropocentrist rhetoric or the moral agency of nonhumans. 
Identifying robots as the “correct” targets of systemic abjection not only 
justifies the logic, political utility, and technical infrastructure of oppression. 
It also demands methods for identifying and classifying humans within that 
framework, if only so they are not mistaken for robots. This is not unique 
to Bryson’s specific articulation of the view but is endemic to the very logic 
of human supremacy as a policy solution in AI ethics. Human supremacy 
attempts to protect humans from systemic abuse by constructing a 
political framework around systemic abuse and then declaring humans to 
be a privileged category exempt from that abuse. In this way, human 
supremacist advocates will inevitably find themselves committed to the 
project of fitting humans within frameworks of systemic abuse. Likewise, 
the entrenched powers which benefit from systemic abuse will naturally 
find the human supremacist defense of stable power hierarchies 
convenient, even flattering, and will inevitably find themselves promoting 
its application as ideology in AI ethics. 
 
 
Nonideal AI ethics 
Are there alternatives to the ideal theory of reactionary posthumanism? 
Following Mills, Serene Khader advocates for a nonideal universalism that 
emphasizes the nonideal, unjust conditions of political action. Khader 
says, “One defect of ideal theories… is their tendency to redirect our 
evaluative gazes to the wrong normative phenomena” (Khader, 2018, p. 
36). By directing our gaze towards the actual conditions of injustice, 
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Khader argues that we will be in a better position to address those 
injustices. Fazelpour & Lipton have recently introduced a nonideal 
perspective to the AI ethics discourse on algorithmic fairness, arguing that 
“non-ideal theorizing about the demands of justice is a fact-sensitive 
exercise” (Fazelpour & Lipton, 2020, p. 10). While this is a step in the right 
direction, we think the value of a nonideal perspective extends beyond an 
emphasis on empirical methods. To push the analysis, this section looks 
to Khader’s nonideal universalism for other lessons that might be adapted 
to an AI ethics context. 
Khader’s nonideal universalism is developed in the context of a diverse 
transnational feminist movement, partly to address what she calls 
“missionary feminism,” the idea that feminism requires the universal 
adoption of Western liberal humanist values (p. 3). Since these values are 
not universally shared, some critics argue that missionary feminism 
continues the imperialist project of imposing Western values on colonized 
communities. On the other hand, rejecting universal values seems to 
entail a kind of cultural relativism that threatens to undermine feminism as 
an inclusive normative project. Khader argues that this is a false dilemma; 
feminists do not have to choose between imperialism and relativism. For 
Khader, feminism is defined negatively, as an opposition to sexist 
oppression. A nonideal feminism starts in conditions of injustice and seeks 
to reduce or eliminate that injustice where it exists. This does not require a 
shared commitment to Western ideals or any other background of 
parochial values to serve as a normative ground for feminist solidarity. 
Khader’s approach “rejects the notion that there is a single feminism-
compatible cultural form, thereby undermining the idea that an idealized 
Western culture is the feminist solution” (p. 7). However, this pluralist 
approach does not commit feminism to a nihilistic cultural relativism. 
Rather than focusing on disagreements between community ideals 
considered abstractly, Khader’s nonideal approach recognizes that “the 
effectiveness of strategies for change varies based on the material 
conditions and moral vernacular(s) of a given context” (p. 4). Thus, a focus 
on the actual, unjust conditions of sexist oppression opens space for 
building a consensus toward practical steps that reduce or eliminate sexist 
oppression, without demanding univocity in the background norms 
informing this work. 
AI ethicists who are sympathetic to the critique of human supremacy 
developed in this paper may find themselves facing a dilemma similar to 
the one Khader describes in the transnational feminist discourse. Like 
missionary feminism, human supremacy continues and expands a 
Western imperialist ideology that some ethicists will be hesitant to 
endorse. However, abandoning humanist ideals may seem to leave us in 
a moral vacuum, without conceptual guidance for protecting the interests 
of persons and communities under genuine threat of systemic oppression. 
This concern might simply reflect a parochial Western bias; as mentioned 
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earlier, many indigenous or non-Western perspectives operate on non-
anthropocentric ethical frameworks. Nevertheless, as a practical matter, 
the international law and policy framework of human rights is not just 
abstract, ideal theory; it is also an established institutional reality, one 
which can mobilize material resources and direct international cooperation 
in the service of real human interests. This is not to say the framework of 
human rights achieves every ideal it aspires to, but simply that it is an 
important and useful tool in the toolbox, one which would work better if it 
were applied more consistently and inclusively, rather than if it were 
whittled down or eliminated, at least absent better options on the table. If 
the critique of human supremacy developed in this paper implies that the 
framework of human rights is an imperialist project, some AI ethicists may 
be tempted to bite the bullet and admit their preference for an imperialist 
ethical regime. 
However, Khader’s discussion of nonideal universalism suggests a way 
for AI ethicists to avoid the apparent compromise of principle, where we 
can productively engage an institutional framework like human rights while 
rejecting the imperialist framings of reactionary posthumanism and human 
supremacy. Following Khader’s nonideal universalism, we might construct 
a nonideal AI ethics that begins in conditions of systemic oppression and 
seeks to reduce or eliminate that oppression. This project does not require 
a monolithic or exclusive idealization of human agency or cognitive 
capacity. We can use the framework of human rights to protect the 
interests of actual human communities without treating that framework as 
a chauvinist characterization of the ideal rights-bearing agent, one which 
might justify the exclusion, abjection, or oppression of other humans or 
nonhumans. A nonideal AI ethics rejects the notion of a single ethics-
compatible cultural form of agency or capacity, thereby undermining the 
idea that an idealized Western anthropocentrism is the ethical solution.  
This opens space for rethinking the sociotechnical matrix of human and 
artificial agents in dynamic political terms, without being misdirected by an 
impulse to comparison, exclusion, or hierarchy. Robots are situated within 
existing sociopolitical structures to materially extend and reinforce 
systems of domination and control, but they also encounter these systems 
as a practical constraint on their operation, and so can also be mobilized 
to resist, dismantle, and repurpose these systems. As such, robots may 
already figure within normative communities as having varying degrees of 
agency, complex social alliances, and relationships with other human and 
nonhuman agents. A critical discourse on robots and AI in nonideal 
conditions can recognize how overlapping structures of institutional 
oppression situate robots as both agents and targets of power—as agents 
whose identity and operation must be made available for inspection, public 
scrutiny, and abuse (Romero, 2018; Smith & Zeller, 2017; Brscić et al., 
2015; Salvini et al., 2010). To some extent, the actual circumstances of 
these arrangements and the moral vernaculars of the communities 
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involved should play a role in our collective assessment of the robot’s 
impact and value. 
There are already efforts to reimagine the complex interdependent social 
and political relationships between human and nonhuman agents 
(Rahwan et al., 2019; Rainey, 2016). Crawford & Joler break down the 
manufacturing, labor, and supply chains involved in the production and 
distribution of Amazon’s Alexa, describing, “a vast planetary network, 
fueled by the extraction of non-renewable materials, labor, and data” 
(Crawford & Joler, 2018). They continue,  
A full accounting for these costs is almost impossible, but it is increasingly 
important that we grasp the scale and scope if we are to understand and govern 
the technical infrastructures that thread through our lives. (para. 5) 
The human costs of this technical infrastructure are visible in well-known 
cases like the use of low-paid crowdsourced labor in machine learning 
(Lung, 2012). They are also visible in more recent variations, such as 
Kiwibots, a robotics company building delivery service robots in the Bay 
Area. Kiwibots farms out the robot’s control task out to human operators in 
Colombia who are paid less than $2 an hour, which owners claim is more 
than the local minimum wage (Said, 2019). Such cases complicate the 
idealized moral ontologies constructed around human individuals and 
robot abjection. As Jackson (2020) says, “The more “the human” declares 
itself “universal,” the more it imposes itself and attempts to crowd out 
correspondence across the fabric of being and competing conceptions of 
being” (p. 32). Resisting this imposition requires more than rejecting the 
vocabulary of the human, it requires the moral courage to imagine 
alternative relationships with being. 
We end the paper with two brief examples involving the use of bots by 
activist communities (Savage et al., 2016). The term “bot” typically has a 
negative connotation in social media spaces, associated with spam, 
trolling, and other malicious uses. This animosity has led to the word “bot” 
being used as a slur or insult to attack the credibility of other people online 
(Roth, 2018). But some bots are neutral or even helpful, such as bots that 
automatically report earthquakes or tell jokes. Scholars have attempted to 
systematically classify robot kinds into benign or malicious varieties 
(Stieglitz et al., 2017). However, this idealized project runs into immediate 
challenges in any practical setting. So-called “bot disclosure” laws have 
faced objections from civil rights groups like the EFF, who worry that an 
“across the board bot-labeling mandate would sweep up all bots,” 
including those being used for protected speech (EFF, 2018, p. 1). 
Suárez-Serrato et al. (2018) discuss the use of bots by human rights 
activists in Mexico organizing around the #Tanhuato hashtag to evade 
state censorship. They write, 
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It is important to pause here and notice that in an instance like this it is not a clear 
matter whether these bots were benevolent or malignant. It is a matter of 
perspective. From the point of view of the Mexican armed forces, these bots are 
acting against their honor. From the point of view of the CNDH they are promoting 
access to a report of human rights abuse. (p. 2) 
The #Tanhuato activists illustrate how the classification and alignment of 
bots is already a political issue with direct implications for human rights. 
This discussion does not hinge on armchair musings about far future 
technologies, or misconceptions over machine agency. The discussion 
arises from the actual conditions of injustice faced by persons under threat 
of a surveillance state, and the role bots can play in navigating these 
conditions. The crude algorithmic agency of Twitter bots evades state 
censorship and retaliation in ways that contribute to resistance efforts; the 
fate of these bots might even serve as synecdoche for the conditions of 
injustice themselves, where silencing bots is silencing people.  
The #botALLY community provides another example where the social 
status of bots is an explicit object of political concern. When an update to 
Twitter’s automation policy threatened to remove many prosocial bots 
from the network, a community of bot developers successfully organized 
around the #botALLY hashtag to pressure the company to change its 
policy and allow certain bots to operate (smith, 2017). The developers 
stressed not only the positive role these bots play in the community, but 
also the bot developer’s responsibility for the bot’s operation and the 
culture they produce. One developer and organizer, Darius Kazemi, built a 
bot that tweets mashups composed by swapping the subjects from two 
different headlines12. Occasionally, the mashup involved subjects of 
different genders, resulting in automated headlines that appeared to be 
making transphobic insults. On receiving feedback from the community, 
Kazemi designed a word filter that would check for certain slurs or insults 
before tweeting the results (Kazemi, 2015). He explained the importance 
of an ethical code to the #botALLY community, saying, “I just don’t want 
my bots doing things that I wouldn’t do myself” (smith, 2017, para. 6).  
The #botALLY community shows how a close identification with robots 
can motivate developers to take greater responsibility for their bots and 
the cultures they (re)produce. This follows from an ethic that recognizes 
robots as operating within a community for which its members take 
responsibility. This recognition does not come at the expense of human 
interests; on the contrary, identifying with machines puts the community in 
a better position to address the interests of all its members. Like the 
#Tanhuato activists, this recognition does not trade on anthropomorphic 
exaggerations of machine agency. In both cases, the use of bots 
demonstrates a technically sophisticated appreciation of the agential 








operate within. Kazemi says #botALLY has “always been a bit tongue in 
cheek, not so much as friends of robots qua robots but rather as a banner 
for a kind of white-hat art-bot maker” (personal communication, 2019 April 
25). This playfulness with the boundaries of agency helps open the space 
for critical reflections on a developer’s responsibility for their bots. 
To these ends, Kazemi and the #botALLY community have produced 
guidelines for bot developers looking to make prosocial bots (O’Leary 
2016, Kazemi 2013). These guidelines include principles like “A bot is an 
extension of its creator’s will” and “Bots should punch up” (O’Leary, 2016; 
Richardson, 2013). Similar principles are elaborated in Microsoft’s 
guidelines for “Responsible bots” (Cheng, 2018), which includes 
suggestions like “Design your bot so that it respects relevant cultural 
norms and guards against misuse” (p. 2), “Ensure your bot treats people 
fairly” (p. 3), and “Ensure a seamless hand-off to a human where the 
human-bot exchange leads to interactions that exceed the bot’s 
competence” (p. 2). Microsoft’s guidelines come two years after their 
public failure developing the chatbot Tay.ai, which quickly learned to 
repeat racist hate speech on social media (Neff, 2016). Commenting on 
the Tay.ai controversy, Schlesinger et al. (2018) echoes Haraway’s call to 
“stay with the trouble”, arguing that  
Critical issues cannot be addressed through neat separations between what 
people do and how machines operate. In determining where we go from here, we 
have to hold onto the complexities of our lived experiences, refusing to reduce the 
world into something that is uniform or singular. (p. 9) 
They go on to recommend ways of mitigating the harms caused by 
chatbots, including developing “bots that are capable of recognizing and 
responding to race talk in the near future” (p. 9), which they admit “is no 
small task and there is no silver bullet” (p. 9). 
These recommendations around the development and use of prosocial 
robots can be understood as applications of a nonideal AI ethics, focused 
on mitigating real short-term harms while avoiding idealized, monolithic, or 
parochial solutions. The principles are generous with machine agency and 
sensitive to fluid exchanges between humans and machines, while taking 
seriously the developer’s responsibility for their robots and the impact they 
have on the social dynamics in which they are embedded. Far from utopic, 
these principles start from a recognition of existing conditions of injustice 
and systemic oppression, and they seek to build robots that are 
responsive to these conditions and operate in ways that minimize or 
eliminate those injustices. For those of us committed to collective 
empowerment without domination, these recommendations point us to 
ways of including robots in this project. 
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